This study argues that post-crisis discussions on central bank independence are less about a choice of a level of independence but more about a relation between the independence and the central bank mandate in financial stability. An offered hypothesis states that an increasing role of financial factors in the macroeconomic policy agenda has led to emerging of two approaches to the central bank independence. Within the orthodox approach, responsibility for the financial stability is a challenge to the accepted model: one mandate – one goal – one instrument. Interference into the financial cycle impairs transparency and distorts responsibility, while deflation bias risks get in conflict with price stability principles, adherence to which is exactly what central banks are granted independence for. In terms of the heterodox approach, a wider responsibility of central banks for financial stability requires more independence to protect the legitimacy of interference into the financial cycle and implementation of a more prudent regulatory regime. Orthodox view is contradictory in its nature, while the vulnerability of the second approach lies in quality of institutional environment. Price stability mandate is argued to remain the first priority, while the financial stability issues should be institutionalized in a clearer way to secure independence.
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